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History:

“The J22” and the April 30th, 1975

QĐND - Wednesday, April 14, 2010, 22:58 (GMT+7)

Liberation troops occupied Saigon's Ministry of Defence. Photo: phapluattp.vn

PANO - “The J22” was the code name of the Intelligence Department under the B2 Staff of the South Liberation Army in the resistance war against the American invaders.

In the resistance war against the American invaders, especially since the mid-1965 when the US poured their troops in Vietnam, the quantity of valuable documents and materials provided by the J22 was significantly increased.

That intelligence was gathered and transferred regularly to their superiors by talented spies such as Pham Xuan An in the cover of a permanent correspondent of The Time in Sai Gon, Dang Tran Duc as a member of the Central Commission on Intelligence of Sai Gon Government, Vu Ngoc Nha as a religion consultant of the President of the Sai Gon Government and many others planted in their Ministry of Defence, General Staff and Parliament.

At that time, the American and the Sai Gon government had a series of top-secret plans marked AB. In October every year, the Commander in Chief of the American expeditionary troops in Vietnam and the Chief of the General Staff of the Sai Gon Army signed in the action program of the American-Sai Gon joint forces for the next year.

This document was named AB Plan. What magical was that annually, copies of such documents as AB 145, AB 146, AB 147 and others of the following years appeared in the offices of the Staff of the South Front and the General Staff in Hanoi after only a week from when they were signed. Other unscheduled plans, which had high strategic value, were all reported by the J22.

Consecutive military, political, and diplomatic failures, especially after their defeat in the “Dien Bien Phu Battle in the air”, over 12 days in late 1972, forced the Americans to signed the Paris Accords.

Under the Accords, the last American soldier had to be withdrawn from the South of Vietnam by March 27^th, 1973. Then, only the troops of the Sai Gon Army with supports of weaponry from the America were involved in the war.

To prepare for important battles to liberate the South, some officers including Senior Lieutenant Colonel Sau Tri, Commander of J22 and I, Nguyen Van Tau, Deputy Commissar of J22, were ordered to come to the North for training courses.

Sau Tri learnt in the Military Academy, and I went to the Academy of Politics. When we had just completed half of the time of the two-year course, the situation in the war had had seen great changes.

The Central Highlands Campaign saw a victory in March, 1975, and the enemy’s troops bore a fierce mood. After that, Hue and Da Nang were liberated. A golden opportunity was generated.

The Politburo set the determination to liberate the South before the rainy season came. Due to the changes, we were ordered to return to the front. We eagerly took off to come in time to join the final battle.

Arriving at Loc Ninh Base, Sau Tri was immediately assigned to Sai Gon urban area to take over high level intelligence units there, and I was appointed as the Commissar of the 316^th Ranger Brigade which was in Cu Chi and was moving to Sai Gon. At that time, many units of the brigade had penetrated to the urban area to pave the way.

The 316^th Ranger Brigade, under the instructions of the B2 Staff, was founded in October, 1974 with the personnel from the J22 to prepare for taking action when opportunities generated. Its aim was to trick the enemy.

Commanders from battalion levels (also called Z) to brigade level were from the Intelligence Department of the South Front. Nguyen Thanh Tung, Deputy Commander of the J22 was appointed as the Commander of the brigade; the Commissar was Muoi Khanh, an experienced spy, who was replaced by me when we opened fire on Sai Gon.

One of the brigade’s typical battles was the attack on Rach Chiec Bridge on April 27^th, late at night. The Z33 lost 50 soldiers in holding the bridge until 10 a.m. April 30^th, and they won control of it that night. Another example was the Z28’s assault to the General Staff’s Headquarters of the Sai Gon Army at 9:30 a.m. April 30^th, which disrupted the command of the enemy’s High Command before our major forces came. These were just some brave deeds contributing to the victory of the Ho Chi Minh Campaign of the 316^th Ranger Brigade – the fighting unit under the J22.

After infiltrating into Sai Gon urban area, Sau Tri stayed at Ba Le’s home, a spy of the A.20 Intelligence Group, also a prestigious parliamentarian of the Sai Gon Government.

On the morning of April 30^th, the Duong Van Minh administration was confused in their efforts at getting rid of our 5 pronged attack forwarding to Sai Gon. There were violent arguments between the warlike and peace-loving sides in Sai Gon Cabinet.

Being informed by Ba Le and To Van Cang, one of our spies, a prestigious member of the peace-loving side, Duong Van Minh knew Sau Tri was in Sai Gon. The President sent two officers to Ba Le’s house to ask for Sau Tri’s opinion about founding a 3-party joint government as they thought he was a high ranking official of the National Front for Liberating the South. Tri said that in the situation, surrender was the best choice for them.

In such a historic moment, Sau Tri, Ba Le, To Van Cang went to the Independence Palace to persuade Duong Van Minh to surrender.

While they were talking, the 203^rd Brigade’s tanks rammed the palace’s gate and moved into the front yard. Then, Duong Van Minh was arrested and taken to the Sai Gon Radio Station to announce surrender while Sau Tri was asked to stay and wrote the “Military Order No1” to stabilise the situation.

There were many more silent deeds of the J22. Here are just two typical examples of them:

The first one was that in early April, 1975, when the enemy was in a tragic situation, Nguyen Van Thieu sent a delegation of Vietnam Republic Parliament to the U.S. to urge for more supports from the Congress to save Thieu’s regime.

The delegation was headed by Dinh Van De, Vice President of the Vietnam Republic Parliament. He was a spy of the J22. He is now living in Ho Chi Minh City with his brother. Both of them are now over 80.

De said, during the visit, in addition to his negotiations in official meetings, he also talked with prestigious American parliamentarians personally, following the orders of his senior officers of J22, to persuade them not to approve the American President in supporting Thieu.

As the result, the President was required to supply more money, but not to make any more military intervention.

The second one was that in mid-April, 1975, just before our attack on Sai Gon began, the Politburo asked the intelligence officers whether the American would send their troops to save the Sai Gon Government if we persevered and launched our great offensive on Sai Gon.

The right answer was given by Nguyen Van Minh, a spy from J22. Minh had been a master sergeant working in the Office of the Chief of Staff in Sai Gon, who kept their top secret documents.

He once received a copy of the letter which the American President sent to Thieu. The letter read in brief that the Vietnam War was considered to be ended to the Americans, thus they only supply 700 million dollars more and everything depended on the Sai Gon government.

Minh made another copy of the letter and sent it to the High Command of the Front. Based on the letter, the Politburo set a strong determination to launch a speedier and bolder offensive on the last base of the Sai Gon government.

For the achievements that the J22 won, this unit was granted the Hero of the People’s Armed Forces in 2000.

Colonel Nguyen Van Tau, Hero of the People’s Armed Forces.

Translated by Le Trang

Published in Viet Nam People's Army Newspaper Online:

http://www.qdnd.vn/QDNDSite/en-US/75/72/184/164/207/109192/Default.aspx

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